I. INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2010, voters in Iowa fired three of the Iowa Supreme Court's seven justices. 1 Under constitutional reforms that Iowans had adopted nearly half a century earlier, each of those justices had been appointed by the state's governor from a list of names supplied by the state's judicial nominating commission, 2 but then was required to stand for a retention vote after a short initial period of service and every eight years thereafter.
3 Chief Justice Marsha Ternus had been appointed to the state's high court by Republican Governor Terry Branstad in 1993 and was on the November 2010 ballot seeking her third eight-year term; Justice Michael Streit had been appointed by Democratic Governor Tom Vilsack in 2001 and was seeking his second eight-year term; and Justice David Baker had been appointed by Democratic Governor Chet Culver in 2008 and was seeking his first eight-year term. 4 Under ordinary circumstances, each of those justices would have been virtually guaranteed success on Election Day. Since Iowa moved from an 2011] THE OUSTER OF THREE JUSTICES 717 voters rejected the three justices' bids to remain on the court. 13 One leader of the ouster campaign declared that Iowa's voters had done "'God's will by standing up to the three judges who would try to redefine God's institution and say that marriage is anything other than one man and one woman. '" 14 Another leader of the campaign joyously predicted that the election results would "'send a message across the country that the power resides with the people. '" 15 Supporters held signs declaring, "'It's we the people, not we the courts. '" 16 Judging from national press reports 17 and from remarks made by academics and judges during casual conversations at this mid-November Kansas symposium, Iowa was indeed the epicenter of tremors felt across the country. Yet it is far from apparent precisely what those tremors portend. If the three ousted justices had plainly flouted judicial norms, the lesson for jurists in Iowa and elsewhere would be clear: when the legal issues are sufficiently salient, citizens will take advantage of an opportunity to punish judges who violate the norms of their profession. What makes the Iowa experience so problematic is that, no matter what one's political preferences might be on the issue of same-sex marriage, one who reads the Varnum opinion will find that the court's reasoning fell well within the parameters of established methods of constitutional analysis. The three justices did not lose their jobs by violating widely embraced conventions of constitutional reasoning. Rather, they lost their jobs by reaching a conclusion that many citizens found morally and politically objectionable.
To help make sense of what happened in Iowa and of what it could mean for jurisdictions nationwide, this paper will describe the path from 62,000).
13. See IOWA SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT (Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RESULTS REPORT], available at http://www.sos.state.ia.us/pdfs/elections/2010/ judicialorr.pdf (reporting vote totals indicating that voters denied Justice Baker's and Justice Streit's bids for retention by a margin of fifty-four to forty-six and denied Chief Justice Ternus's bid for retention by a margin of fifty-five to forty-five).
14. Jason Hancock, Chuck Hurley: Ousting Iowa Supreme Court Justices Was 'God's Will,' IOWA INDEP., Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://iowaindependent.com/46996/chuck-hurley-oustingiowa-supreme-court-justices-was-gods-will (quoting Chuck Hurley, president of the Iowa Family Policy Center).
15. Sulzberger, supra note 1 (quoting Bob Vander Plaats); see also infra Part III (discussing Vander Plaats' role in the non-retention campaign).
16. Sulzberger, supra note 1. Varnum to the three justices' ouster, and then suggest a number of important lessons that one can draw from the experience.
II. THE VARNUM OPINION
Varnum v. Brien involved an action brought by Katherine Varnum and eleven other members of same-sex couples who had applied for marriage licenses in Polk County, Iowa.
18 Timothy Brien, in his capacity as the Polk County Recorder, had denied those applications pursuant to the state's ban on same-sex marriage. 19 The Polk County District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 20 and the case moved directly to the Iowa Supreme Court on appeal. 21 The Iowa Supreme Court's methodological approach to the constitutional question before it was far from novel-indeed, unanimity would have been difficult to achieve if one or more of the justices had insisted on deviating from interpretive norms. If anything is remarkable about the form of the opinion itself, it is the great patience and clarity with which the court explained its reasoning. Justice Mark Cady, the opinion's author, seemed to go out of his way to walk through the analysis in a manner that an educated lay reader could easily understand. Perhaps with that very objective in mind, the court opted not to depend in any way on the doctrine of substantive due process-a doctrine on which the trial court had partially relied, 22 but also a doctrine that is famously controversial for its lack of clear textual grounding and that is difficult to explain even in law school classrooms. Instead, the Iowa Supreme Court relied entirely upon the equality clause of the Iowa Constitution, which reads: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens." 23 In determining the import of that provision in the case at hand, the court asked a series of familiar questions-questions 21. See IOWA CODE § 602.4102(2) (permitting the supreme court to take a case directly from a district court and then decide whether to refer the case to the Iowa Court of Appeals).
22. See Varmun, 763 N.W.2d at 877 ("The district court concluded the statute was unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution . . . .").
23. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; see also id. § 1 ("All men and women are, by nature, free and equal . . . ."). The statute's language was straightforward: "Only a marriage between a male and a female is valid."
25
Defenders of the statute argued that it did not classify individuals at all-everyone, they said, was equally free to marry a person of the opposite sex. 26 The justices acknowledged that the Iowa statute did not expressly mention sexual orientation, but nevertheless found a sexual-orientation classification lurking beneath the statute's text:
[T]he right of a gay or lesbian person under the marriage statute to enter into a civil marriage only with a person of the opposite sex is no right at all. Under such a law, gay or lesbian individuals cannot simultaneously fulfill their deeply felt need for a committed personal relationship, as influenced by their sexual orientation, and gain the civil status and attendant benefits granted by the statute. Instead, a gay or lesbian person can only gain the same rights under the statute as a heterosexual person by neglecting the very trait that defines gay and lesbian people as a class-their sexual orientation.
27
The court then sought to determine the appropriate standard of review for sexual-orientation classifications.
28
Invoking the widely recognized criteria for making such determinations, 29 the court found that some form of heightened scrutiny, rather than rational-basis review, was appropriate. First, the court observed that "gay and lesbian people as a group have long been the victim of purposeful and invidious discrimination because of their sexual orientation." 30 Second, the court found that a person's sexual orientation bears no relationship to his or her "ability to contribute to society," and that classifications based on sexual orientation are thus likely to be "based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice." 31 Third, the court found that even if one's sexual orientation is not an absolutely immutable trait, it is "highly resistant to change," and thus "is not the type of human trait that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to selfhelp."
32 Finally, the court determined that "gay and lesbian people are not so politically powerful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history suggests produces discrimination based on sexual orientation." 33 The court then found that it need not yet choose between intermediate and strict scrutiny for sexual-orientation classifications because Iowa's ban on same-sex marriage could not survive under the less stringent of those two standards. 34 Tracking the U.S. Supreme Court's well-established description of intermediate scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause, 35 the Varnum court stated that, to survive judicial review, Iowa's ban on same-sex marriage "'must be substantially related to an important governmental objective'" 36 and the state must have "'exceedingly persuasive' reasons for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples." 37 The court determined that the statute failed to meet those demanding standards. Simply preserving the traditional concept of marriage was not a sufficiently persuasive governmental objective, the court said, because it would render the analysis entirely circular: it was the constitutional validity of the state's effort to preserve the traditional concept of marriage that was itself in question. 38 Promoting the best interests of children is certainly an important governmental goal, the court observed, 39 but the ban on same-sex marriage was not substantially related to that objective. Even if one believes that children are better off when raised by opposite-sex parents than when raised by same-sex parents, 40 children were under-inclusive insofar as the statute permitted "child abusers, sexual predators, parents neglecting to provide child support, and violent felons" to marry, even though they "are undeniably less than optimal parents." 41 The court further found that the statute's means were over-inclusive insofar as many same-sex couples would never bear or raise children. 42 Nor was the ban on same-sex marriage substantially related to the goal of promoting procreation-the court found no reason to believe that, finding themselves unable to marry persons of their own sex, gays and lesbians would opt to enter into heterosexual relationships and bear children. 43 Similarly, the court found that promoting the stability of heterosexual relationships is an important governmental objective, but that there was no apparent reason to believe that proscribing same-sex marriages helped to achieve that goal.
44
In the court's judgment, the lack of a good fit between important government objectives and the ban on same-sex marriage demonstrated that the statute "is less about using marriage to achieve [important governmental ends] and more about merely precluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage." 45 Finding no "exceedingly persuasive" justification for refusing to recognize same-sex marriages, the justices declared the statute unconstitutional.
46
Iowa's first same-sex marriage ceremonies were conducted within weeks of the ruling. 47 Over the course of the following year, more than of children are served equally well by same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents," but conceded "the existence of reasoned opinions that dual-gender parenting is the optimal environment for children." Id.; see also 49 calls for a constitutional amendment to restore the ban on samesex marriage erupted immediately after the Varnum opinion came down. 50 Yet the amendment process in Iowa is arduous. 51 The state constitution gives voters an opportunity every ten years to decide whether to hold a constitutional convention. 52 Yet voters have repeatedly declined that invitation, 53 and they declined it again in November 2010 by a two-to-one margin. 54 The only other way to amend the constitution involves a lengthy series of votes: a proposal to amend the constitution must first win the approval of a majority in the state legislature; after an intervening general election, the proposal must again win the backing of a majority in the state legislature; and then the proposed amendment must be submitted to the citizenry for final approval. 55 Using retention elections as an occasion to express disapproval of particular rulings was certainly not what those who first urged states to adopt merit-selection and retention systems originally had in mind. Albert Kales, co-founder of the American Judicature Society, proposed a merit-selection system for state judges in 1914, hoping to curb the perceived evils associated with judges who had to depend upon winning elections and remaining in good stead with politically powerful actors in order to win and keep their seats on the bench. 57 Kales and likeminded reformers added retention elections to their proposals not because they regarded those elections as an essential piece of the puzzle, but rather because they believed that including some sort of opportunity for voter input would be essential in order to make their proposals politically saleable among influential Progressives. 58 As Judge Duane Benton of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently observed, retention elections were designed to allow qualified judges to serve long terms with only a modest amount of direct accountability. Indeed, those who developed the concept preferred life tenure, but they acquiesced to political realities and allowed the public an opportunity to remove judges in extreme circumstances. Clearly removal was perceived as the exception, not the rule. Yet there is nothing to prevent a voter from casting a ballot against a judge's retention for any reason he or she likes. Indeed, many citizens reject the proposition that they ought to defer to judges in the face of rulings they find objectionable, finding that notion elitist and antidemocratic. 60 For better or worse, if voters are sufficiently angry about a particular ruling and are convinced that the justices reached the wrong conclusion-as were many in Iowa after the Iowa Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Varnum-judicial retention elections give them an opportunity to express their convictions.
The notion of removing three state supreme court justices in one fell swoop was audacious, but not entirely unprecedented-it had happened elsewhere once before. In November 1986, California voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Justice Joseph Grodin from the California Supreme Court, primarily for their staunch opposition to the death penalty. 61 If voter dissatisfaction had led to the ouster of three state supreme court justices once before in California, there was at least a slim chance that it could happen again in Iowa.
The non-retention campaign against Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker crystallized in the late summer of 2010 under the leadership of Bob Vander Plaats, a Sioux City businessman who was just coming off a defeat in the Republican gubernatorial primary. 
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Vander Plaats's chief opponent in that primary had been Terry Branstad, who ultimately would go on to defeat the Democratic incumbent, Chet Culver, in the general election later that fall.
63
The battle between Vander Plaats and Branstad had been a battle between "religious, social and tea party conservatives," who tended to favor Vander Plaats, and "business-oriented conservatives and centrists," who tended to favor Branstad. 64 As one reporter noted the day after Vander Plaats's defeat, Branstad had largely avoided the marriage debate, while Vander Plaats had placed his opposition to Varnum at the center of his primary campaign:
Branstad campaigned largely as a pragmatist, arguing he had the best shot of ousting Democratic Gov. Chet Culver. He focused on economic matters and glossed over emotional social issues, such as abortion and gay marriage. That prompted some conservatives, most notably leaders of the influential Iowa Family Policy Center, to threaten to sit out the general election if Branstad won the nomination. Vander Plaats tried to appeal to social and religious conservatives by concentrating on gay marriage, an issue that soared to prominence last year after the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a ban on same-sex unions violated the state constitution.
65
During his unsuccessful primary bid, Vander Plaats had urged Iowans to vote against retaining each of the three justices who would appear on the November 2010 ballot. 66 Indeed, he even went so far as to pledge that, on his first day in office, he would issue an executive order thwarting Varnum by barring all same-sex marriages in the state. 67 There Iowa's constitution would make him the state's "chief magistrate," he argued, and this would give him the "authority to check judicial review." 69 After mulling over the possibility of an independent bid for the governorship, Vander Plaats announced on August 6, 2010, that he would devote his energies instead to leading the effort to oust the three Iowa Supreme Court justices who were up for retention. 70 He created an organization called Iowa for Freedom to lead that campaign. 71 Vander Plaats's actions alarmed many attorneys, academics, and former judges in the state. They insisted that the non-retention initiative would threaten the Iowa judiciary's independence by injecting a heightened measure of partisanship and politics into the selection and retention of Iowa's judges, and that Vander Plaats's campaign would diminish the number of qualified individuals who would be interested in taking seats on the state bench. 72 The Institute for Legal Reform-an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce-had recently released a study finding that Iowa's judges ranked fourth in the nation for impartiality. 73 This finding confirmed what many in Iowa's legal community already believed-and they feared that Vander Plaats's campaign would place Iowa's reputable judicial system at risk. 74 Former Iowa Governor Robert Ray, a Republican, recalled the state of affairs prior to 1962 when aspiring judges had to run political campaigns to obtain and keep their seats on the bench, and he urged voters to retain the justices: "I have a lot of respect for this system that we have. I practiced law when it was the other way and I'll tell you that wasn't much fun. . . . I think most people aren't going to want to throw them out because they did what they thought was the right thing to do." 77 Vander Plaats, however, did not have difficulty finding political allies. A coalition of Iowa pastors urged their congregations to vote against the justices' retention, for example, even while acknowledging that electoral advocacy could invite scrutiny of their organizations' taxexempt status by the Internal Revenue Service. 78 The pastors said that the Texas-based Liberty Institute had agreed to provide free legal representation if the IRS did indeed bring actions against them.
79 A leader of the pastors' coalition almost pleaded with the IRS to come after him, saying that he often recited a short prayer: "'Dear God, . 82 Two out-of-state organizations-the American Family Association and the National Organization for Marriage-played particularly influential roles, together pouring nearly $700,000 into the campaign to unseat the justices. 83 This sum is all the more remarkable when one considers that, counting both in-state and out-of-state money, a total of approximately $800,000 was reportedly spent on the effort to reject the justices' bids for retention, 84 roughly double the amount spent on the effort to retain the justices.
85
Those non-retention dollars were used to wage a highly visible campaign. For example, in one television advertisement sponsored by 80 An online video addressed to the state's religious leaders recited the justices' annual salaries and benefits; accused the justices of disregarding the will of the people and "160-years of Iowa law" when they overturned the ban on same-sex marriage; suggested that the justices might next disregard Iowans' rights in the areas of property, parenting, voting, and "teach[ing] the truths of God;" and urged pastors and congregants to "pray effectively and vote righteously."
87 Another online video played off of viewers' familiarity with eHarmony.com, the popular dating website: with the logo "e.Larmony.wrong" appearing at the bottom of the screen, a man and a woman discussed the history of their relationship and marriage, only to reveal at the end that they were brother and sister and that they were grateful to the Iowa Supreme Court for making their marriage possible.
88
The justices' defenders formed a variety of groups to fight back. In mid-August, one week after Vander Plaats formally announced his "Iowa for Freedom" campaign, a bipartisan group of individuals joined with the Iowa State Bar Association in launching an organization called Iowans for Fair and Impartial Courts (IFIC). 89 In late September, two former lieutenant governors (one Democrat and one Republican) created Justice Not Politics-a coalition of organizations that joined together in arguing that "Iowa's merit selection and retention process keeps politics and campaign money out of our courts, safeguarding its fairness and impartiality."
91 But the creators of both IFIC and Justice Not Politics established themselves as tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organizations that could not overtly take a position on whether Iowans should vote for or against the justices' retention. 92 Many of Justice Not Politics' coalition members were themselves 501(c)(3) organizations, 93 and could not have participated in the coalition if the group had expressly urged voters to retain the justices. As for IFIC, the Bar's leaders had concluded that they were not authorized to engage in political advocacy on behalf of the Bar's members until the Bar had completed its 2010 plebiscite, in which attorneys were asked to rate the performances of all of the justices and judges who were up for retention. 94 Because voting in the plebiscite was not scheduled to conclude until late September 95 -more than a month after IFIC was formed-IFIC's founders opted for 501(c)(3) status.
96 As a result, neither Justice Not Politics nor IFIC explicitly campaigned on the justices' behalf; instead, both organizations focused their energies on MOINES REG., Aug. 13, 2010, at B1 (announcing IFIC's creation).
90 99 (By early October, the Bar's members had favorably rated each of the three targeted justices in the 2010 plebiscite, 100 and so the Bar's leaders believed they finally were authorized to take a position on the justices' retention.
101 ) Fair Courts for Us explicitly urged Iowans to keep the state's judiciary "independent," "fair," and "non-partisan" by voting to retain the justices.
102
Two overarching observations can be made about the nature of the pro-retention campaign. First, none of the pro-retention efforts yielded the same visceral punch as the efforts of the non-retention forces. Perhaps nowhere was that more evident than in one well-intentioned but patently feeble series of privately sponsored online videos, in which a woman repeatedly licked salt off her wrist and drank large glasses of water, pledging to "retain water until we retain our justices." 103 IFIC, Justice Not Politics, and Fair Courts for Us certainly advanced more substantive and high-minded messages, but they did so in ways that were less than rhetorically compelling.
Second, in all of the organized pro-retention efforts, one message was conspicuously absent: proponents of retention focused persistently on their claim that Iowa's system for choosing and retaining judges The advertisement began with the voice of a football commentator saying: "And the flags are flying. Looks like a questionable call. I think we're going to see some fans calling for these refs' jobs." 105 Ray's voice then appeared, saying, "Listen, we'll never agree with every call, but you shouldn't fire the good referees over just one call. The same is true for the Iowa Supreme Court."
106
The three justices themselves were reluctant to speak out on their own behalf and refused to raise money to run a retention campaign.
107
The week prior to the election, for example, the three justices were scheduled to appear at an Iowa City event organized by students at the University of Iowa College of Law-but the justices backed out when they learned that the event initially had been billed as a "Vote Yes on Retention" event, rather than an event aimed more generally at educating voters about the work of the courts. 108 Chief Justice Ternus began to speak out somewhat more aggressively in the days immediately prior to the election, telling voters in Fairfield, for example, that voting the justices out of office would lead to more heavily politicized retention , available at http://ottumwacourier.com/local/x1872731036/Targeted-chief-justice-speaks-out ("Ternus and the other justices have said they will not engage in a campaign to retain their seats and they are not raising money to fund such a campaign.").
108. My knowledge of these events is based in part upon the fact that the students had asked me to serve as the event's moderator. Vander Plaats and his Iowa for Freedom organization tried to spin the cancelation as having been provoked by a "public outcry about their campaigning on the taxpayers' dime. battles and that judges make poorer decisions when they have to worry about the personal political consequences of their rulings.
109
When Election Day finally arrived, one player in the Varnum story received good news: Polk County District Judge Robert Hanson-the district judge who had struck down the ban on same-sex marriage at the trial level but who never was aggressively targeted in the non-retention campaign-was among the more than seventy state judges whom the voters opted to retain. 110 The news for the three supreme court justices was more grim. Approximately 450,000 Iowans cast ballots favoring their retention, but more than 530,000 voted against them.
111 Polling conducted by the Des Moines Register just prior to the election indicated that the vote was heavily partisan, with roughly two-thirds of likely Republican voters-but only approximately one-fifth of likely Democratic voters-saying that they intended to vote against the justices.
112 In Iowa City-where the University of Iowa sits and where proponents of same-sex marriage are more easily found than in some other portions of the state-university students flocked to election stations in order to voice their opposition to a city ordinance that prevents individuals under twenty-one years of age from entering bars, but nearly sixty percent of them failed to cast any vote at all on the justices' retention.
113
The day after the election, Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker issued a short joint statement:
It has been our great pleasure to serve the people of Iowa as justices on the Iowa Supreme Court. Throughout our judicial service, we have endeavored to fulfill our duty to Iowans by always adhering to the rule of law, making decisions fairly and impartially according to law, and faithfully upholding the constitution.
We thank all of the Iowans who voted to retain judges around the state for another term. Your support shows that many of our citizens value fair and impartial courts. We also want to acknowledge and thank all the Iowans, from across the political spectrum and from different walks of life, who worked tirelessly over the past few months to defend Iowa's high-caliber court system against an unprecedented attack funded by out-of-state special interest groups.
Finally, we hope Iowans will continue to support Iowa's merit selection system for appointing judges. This system helps ensure that judges base their decisions on the law and the Constitution and nothing else. Ultimately, however, the preservation of our state's fair and impartial courts will require more than the integrity and fortitude of individual judges, it will require the steadfast support of the people.
114
At the time of this writing, the fifteen members of Iowa's judicial nominating commission are working to assemble the slate of names from which the governor will choose in order to fill the supreme court's three vacancies. 115 Under Iowa law, the most senior member of the Iowa Supreme Court who is not the court's chief justice serves as the chair of the nominating commission.
116 That post previously had been held by Justice Mark Cady, Varnum's author. 117 But Justice Cady was chosen by his colleagues to serve as the court's new chief justice, replacing Chief Justice Ternus, so the new chair of the nominating commission will be Justice David Wiggins. . At the time of this writing, there also is a debate brewing about how lame-duck Governor Culver should proceed if the commission presents him with a slate of names before he leaves office in mid-January: Should he fill one or more of the vacancies himself or should he defer to newly elected Governor Branstad? See Editorial, It's Branstad's Call, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Nov. 12, 2010, available at http://thegazette.com/2010/11/12/it's-branstad's-call/ (urging Culver to let Branstad fill the vacancies); Mehaffey, supra note 81 (quoting Branstad as saying that "'it would be inappropriate to have a governor that was just rejected by the voters try to rush through appointments to the court'").
116. See IOWA CONST. art. V, § 16 ("The judge of the supreme court who is senior in length of service on said court, other than the chief justice, shall also be a member of such commission and shall be its chairman.").
117. See Mehaffey, supra note 81 (noting that Justice Cady was then the commission's chair Vander Plaats is urging Iowa's elected officials to find a way to quickly end same-sex marriage in the state. Reviving the idea he floated during his unsuccessful bid for the Republican gubernatorial nomination, 120 Vander Plaats is asking Branstad, the incoming Republican governor, to issue an executive order banning the enforcement of Varnum.
121
Branstad regarded the proposal as unconstitutional during his primary bid and has said that he still remains opposed to the idea.
122
Vander Plaats is also urging the state legislature-where Republicans control the house and where Democrats narrowly control the senate-to enact a new statute banning both samesex marriage and judicial review of the statute's validity, thereby forcing a new confrontation with the Iowa Supreme Court.
123
As for the prospect of adopting a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage, the earliest the issue could be placed before Iowa voters is 2014. 124 Whether that occurs depends almost entirely, for now, upon whether Democrats are able and willing to block the amendment process with their slim majority in the state senate.
125 Michael Gronstal, the senate's Democratic majority leader, successfully blocked debate on the amendment proposal in 2009, and he has vowed to block debate on the measure again when the legislature reconvenes in 2011. 125. See Boshart, supra note 121 (noting that Republicans in the house are likely to propose an amendment banning same-sex marriage, but that the "issue may stall in the Senate"); Todd Dorman, History Is Made, but Not Finished, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://thegazette.com/2010/11/03/history-is-made-but-not-finished ("The Democratic majority in the Senate, if it holds, is likely too narrow to halt a vote on a constitutional amendment banning marriage equity.").
126. 
129 Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who has confirmed that he too is considering a bid for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, 130 is similarly seeking political leverage from Varnum. Prior to the November 2010 election, Gingrich urged Iowans to vote against the justices' retention in order to send the nation a signal that a "citizen revolt" is underway against "dictatorial" judges. 131 At a book signing in West Des Moines two weeks after the November election, Gingrich declared that the four remaining justices on the Iowa Supreme Court ought to resign because voters had made it plain that those justices, too, would have lost their jobs if their names had appeared on the ballot. 
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behavior on the part of some of Iowa's judges and justices, as the justices' defenders warned that it would. 134 There certainly is a great deal of anxiety within the Iowa legal community that the state is now headed in precisely that direction. 135 For two principal reasons, my own expectations are more optimistic. First, it seems to me that the stars fell into a rare and powerful alignment in 2010, with a substantial influx of out-of-state money being used to run a relentless campaign against justices who had issued a high-profile ruling on one of the most controversial social issues of our time during a period marked by strong anti-incumbent and anti-government sentiment-and although the justices' defenders seemed caught almost entirely flat-footed by the nonretention campaign, forty-five to forty-six percent of the Iowa electorate still favored the justices' retention. 136 There is good reason to believe, therefore, that worries about the future of Iowa's courts are overblown. In the wake of California's 1986 retention election, for example, Chief Justice Bird predicted that her ouster would embolden ideologically driven forces to use retention elections to wield great control over the state's judiciary, 137 but those fears have not notably materialized. 138 Two years after the removal of Chief Justice Bird and two of her colleagues from the bench, a former California judge concluded that "the results of the 1986 election are not causes for serious concern. An extraordinary set of circumstances combined to cause them, so extraordinary that it is unlikely that a similar set will soon, or ever, arise again."
139 One hopes that a comparable story will be told about the Iowa election of 2010.
Second, although Vander Plaats and his allies believe they have sent a powerful message to Iowa's judges and justices, the three ousted justices have sent a powerful message of their own. Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker undoubtedly knew that the court's ruling in Varnum would be controversial and they knew that they would be up for retention in 2010, yet they nevertheless ruled in the way that they believed was most faithful to the state's constitutional principles. Vander Plaats believes that those three justices have now McCormick has said, for example, that the only lesson he learned from the successful non-retention campaign in California when he was on the bench was "'that judges have got to have courage.'" 141 I count myself among those who believe that the overwhelming majority of Iowa's judges and justices will draw from the 2010 experience no greater lesson than that. With respect to the Iowa Supreme Court in particular, each of the three new justices will be chosen from the short list of names supplied by the state's judicial nominating commission, and I am confident that the commission will narrow the pool to the same kinds of qualified candidates from among whom Chief Justice Ternus, Justice Streit, and Justice Baker themselves were chosen. The message which [elections like the California judicial election of 1986] sends to judges is that if they want to avoid negative votes, it is best to produce results with which the voters will agree. The risk that judges will receive and act upon that message, unconsciously if not consciously, is substantial. Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969 REV. , 1980 REV. (1988 ; see also Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 197 (2009) (concluding that supreme court justices who face retention votes in Republican-leaning states "tend to decide cases in accord with standard Republican policy," and that the opposite is true for judges facing retention votes in Democratic-leaning states).
141. Schulte, supra note 7. 142. Writing about retention elections in general, Alan Tarr has made a comparable observation: If a qualified judge is removed from office in a retention election and the merit-selection process is working well, then his or her replacement would likewise be a qualified judge. The effect would be great on the particular judge but not, presumably, on the quality of justice within the court system. Although voters can remove a judge with whose interpretations they disagree, they cannot guarantee that the judge's replacement will share their understanding of the law. Tarr, supra note 57, at 631. But negative retention votes surely do have consequences. After his 1986 ouster from the California Supreme Court, for example, Justice Grodin had the following reflection:
[W]hatever the effect of a pending election campaign might be upon judicial decisions, the public perception of effect is inevitable and unavoidable. For example, during the 1986 campaign the court filed an opinion affirming the imposition of the death penalty which I wrote and Justice Reynoso, who was also on the ballot, signed. The opposition group immediately called a press conference to charge that the two of us acted as we did only for political reasons. I know of no effective way to refute that kind of allegation. Grodin, supra note 140, at 1980 (citation omitted). No matter how they rule in particular cases, the members of the Iowa Supreme Court undoubtedly will now have to tolerate comparable speculations about their motivations.
Settings aside the particulars of what might happen next in Iowa, there are a number of important lessons that academics, activists, and judges nationwide might learn from the Iowa experience. I offer several such lessons here, confident that others will add to the list.
A. Money Matters
The nation certainly did not need another lesson on the influential role of money in American politics. Iowa's recent retention election nevertheless reminds us yet again that, when one side in a political contest holds as much as a two-to-one financial advantage over the other, 143 outcomes are not terribly difficult to predict.
144

B. Constitutionalism and Judicial Review Need Better Political Marketing
The non-retention forces insisted that the justices in Varnum illegitimately trumped the sovereign people's will with their own.
145
Celebrating the justices' ouster on election night, Vander Plaats declared that the election would send a nationwide message that "power resides with the people," not with the courts. 146 The justices were depicted as over-paid, out-of-touch members of the "ruling class" who did not understand their proper role in our democratic system of government.
147
Yet the Iowa Constitution is the premier expression of the sovereign people's will in Iowa-like their counterparts in other jurisdictions, Iowans have declared that any statute that violates the constitution is invalid.
148 By seeking to vindicate the apparent demands of the Iowa Constitution's equality clause, 149 the justices in Varnum thus believed that it was precisely the constitutionally enshrined will of the people that they were honoring.
150 By focusing almost entirely on concerns about judicial fairness and impartiality, and by failing to respond aggressively to the claim that the justices had ignored the will of the people, the justices' defenders thus failed to effectively join issue on one of the primary themes of the opposition. Crafting thirty-second television advertisements aimed at defending notions of constitutionalism and judicial review undoubtedly is not easy, but if one's arguments are to gain a powerful foothold in the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens, one must do better than rely upon bloodless abstractions about fairness and the rule of law.
151
In that regard, one cannot help but draw comparisons to the 1986 retention election in California. 152 In the face of highly emotional ads that charged three California justices with favoring killers over victims and their families, the justices themselves opted not to mount a vigorous defense of their rulings, choosing instead to "stress[] the traditional independence of the judiciary"-the one message that pollsters had determined "would not work."
153
As one former California judge observed, the justices and their defenders ran a campaign that "was frequently bland" and that failed to match the raw rhetorical power of the campaign run by their opponents. 154 With admiration for the motives of those who led the pro-retention campaign in Iowa, one finds that the same must be said of their efforts.
C. The Justices' Defenders Made a Mistake When They Opted Not to Defend Varnum on Its Merits
The California comparison suggests another way in which the proretention campaign in Iowa was ill-conceived. Hostility to same-sex marriage permeated the campaign against the justices, but leaders of the pro-retention campaign remained almost entirely silent on the subject. 155 That now seems clearly to have been a mistake. Without a vigorous (Claussen, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out that Iowa's judges are obliged to honor the constitutionally enshrined will of the people of Iowa and that the people themselves have said that judges must invalidate statutes that violate the Iowa Constitution).
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defense of Varnum's reasoning, some of the central claims of the justices' critics were left largely unanswered. The silence of the justices' defenders implicitly conveyed the message that Iowans should opt for the lesser of two evils: the supreme court might occasionally reach conclusions that we would prefer not to defend, the justices' defenders seemed to say, but that arrangement is preferable to one in which money and politics play prominent roles in the work of the courts. Indeed, the justices' defenders sometimes conveyed that message explicitly, as in the radio advertisement sponsored by Fair Courts for Us, in which the targeted justices were likened to good referees who had forgivably erred by making one bad call. 156 Voters who had a viscerally negative reaction to images of homosexuality or same-sex marriage thus were given little reason to reflect critically upon their own moral and religious convictions-instead, they were asked to subordinate those beliefs to beliefs about the need to preserve the integrity of Iowa's courts. Viewed from those voters' vantage point, rhetoric about fairness, impartiality, and judicial independence-stripped from any substantive defense of Varnum itself-was all but certain to fall flat.
D. Defenders of Same-Sex Marriage Must Speak to Their Opponents' Perceptions of Freedom
The justices' critics repeatedly claimed that Varnum signals a threat to a whole range of freedoms, in areas ranging from parenting, to property rights, to hunting, and to voting.
157 Indeed, the organization that Vander Plaats created to lead the non-retention effort was called "Iowa for Freedom," 158 suggesting that freedom was the very thing that the justices in Varnum placed at risk. There are at least two different ways to construe the substantive beliefs that lay beneath that claim. The first possibility is simply that critics of Varnum feared that justices who disregarded the statutorily expressed will of the people on the issue of same-sex marriage might disregard the statutorily expressed will of the people in other areas, as well. There is little doubt that many hold that belief. But the link that social conservatives drew between Varnum and freedom also likely tells us something important about social conservatives' perceptions regarding the marriage issue itself. While defenders of same-sex marriage see Varnum as a ruling that plainly KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 expanded citizens' freedoms by expanding the range of people who could take part in a valued civil institution, many of Varnum's critics see that ruling as constricting citizens' freedoms. They see same-sex marriage as an encroachment upon their territory-an encroachment that narrows their ability to attach their own preferred connotations to the institution of marriage. In a political battle of the sort waged in Iowa's 2010 retention election, that perception demands explicit acknowledgement, unpacking, and critiquing.
E. The Success of the Non-retention Campaign Lends Ironic Support to Varnum's Premises
The justices in Varnum reasoned that some form of heightened scrutiny is appropriate for sexual-orientation classifications because, among other things, gays and lesbians have often been the target of prejudice and lack the political power to respond to that prejudice effectively. 159 The success of the non-retention campaign provides at least a modicum of evidence that the court's observations were well founded. If the reasoning in Varnum needed added reinforcement in order to help persuade skeptical readers, some of Varnum's fiercest critics have helped to provide it.
F. Non-retention Campaigns Are More Likely to Succeed When the Leaders of the Bar Fail to Respond Quickly and Powerfully
About a week after Vander Plaats announced in early August 2010 that he intended to lead a non-retention campaign against the three justices, a group of individuals associated with the Iowa State Bar Association declared that they were launching IFIC in order to thwart Vander Plaats's ambitions. 160 As I have indicated, however, they chose to structure IFIC as a tax-exempt organization that could not engage in direct advocacy on the justices' behalf and thus would have to wage a more abstract campaign focused on the virtues of judicial impartiality and independence. 161 But when justices targeted in a non-retention campaign do not themselves wish to raise funds and actively campaign to keep their seats, the burden of defending them surely falls most heavily on leaders of the Bar-attorneys who live and work in the state ' One does not have to be a professional campaign manager to know that three weeks is precious little time for a campaign to find traction with voters.
One is reminded again of the only other occasion in the nation's history when three justices in one state simultaneously lost their retention battles. In the California election of 1986, "the bar associations of San Francisco and Beverly Hills were the only sizeable organs of the bar . . . that spoke out in support [of the three targeted justices]," and " [t] he Los Angeles County Bar Association, the largest bar group in the state, was silent." 163 The circumstances in Iowa in 2010 certainly were not identical to those in California in 1986-leaders of the Iowa State Bar Association did campaign on behalf of the three justices. 164 But the leaders of the non-retention campaign in Iowa never had to squarely confront sustained and pointed opposition from the Bar. 165 
G. There Might Be an Inverse Relationship Between the Ease with Which Activists Can Place a Proposed Constitutional Amendment Before the Voters and the Likelihood that Justices Will Be Targeted for Non-retention
From the point of view of constitutional system design, it bears noting that if Iowa's social conservatives had been able to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot without first persuading voters to assume all of the risks associated with a constitutional convention and without securing the cooperation of the state legislature-such as by invoking an initiative process comparable to the process that conservatives in California used to place 167 Once Democrats in the state legislature refused to launch the amendment process, 168 opposing the justices' retention was the only immediately available way for social conservatives to try to undermine the court's ruling in Varnum. 169 Had a citizen-driven route to amendment been available, social conservatives might well have channeled their energies in that direction. This is not to say that Iowa necessarily ought to permit constitutional amendments through the initiative process; it is simply to say that Iowa and other states ought to consider these trade-offs when evaluating their approaches to amending their constitutions and choosing and retaining their judges. Justice Grodin-one of the three California justices ousted in 1986-has provocatively taken this line of reasoning one step further, suggesting that when amending a state constitution is as comparatively easy as it is in California, 170 the case becomes stronger for abandoning judicial elections altogether. 171 
H. Democratic Constitutionalism Demands Patience and Sustained Engagement
In some of my recent writings, I have joined a handful of other scholars in describing and defending our system of democratic constitutionalism 172 -a system in which (as Robert Post and Reva Siegel put it) "adjudication is embedded in a constitutional order that regularly invites exchange between officials and citizens over questions of constitutional meaning." 173 At both the state and federal levels, courts, politicians, and ordinary citizens engage with one another over time to slowly produce judicially endorsed doctrines that reflect the public's well-considered constitutional judgments. As Barry Friedman writes, "[j]udges do not decide finally on the meaning of the Constitution. Rather, it is through the dialogic process of 'judicial decision-popular response-judicial re-decision' that the Constitution takes on the meaning it has." 174 The road to constitutional change can thus demand great patience, as citizens and their leaders gradually work their way toward durable constitutional understandings. It has been nearly half a century since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, 175 for example, and the American people still hotly debate precisely where the constitutional lines ought to be drawn in the area of abortion.
In Iowa, the Varnum court powerfully articulated the constitutional case for same-sex marriage and for greater protection of gays and lesbians against majoritarian discrimination. Those who disagreed with the Varnum court's conclusions then sent the Iowa Supreme Court a powerful message of disapproval.
Same-sex marriage remains constitutionally protected in Iowa at the moment, but neither side has yet spoken the last word. In settings ranging from retention elections to proposals to amend state constitutions, proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage nationwide will continue in their battle to propose the synthesis of constitutional values that ultimately wins the acceptance of the sovereign citizenry. 176 Toward that end in Iowa, those who are proud of the court's ruling in Varnum had better be prepared to fight far more wisely and far more effectively than they did in the election of 2010. 
